Whether or not animals are due equal consideration is an unresolved issue. 46) I have defended a moral presumption in favour of equal consideration, and it is clear that appeals to species will not overturn that presumption. Almost as certainly, contract theory will not do so either. But, while no published discussions of the appeals to moral agency and to social bonds have carried the burden of proof on the inegalitarian, it may be premature to preclude the possibility that the relevant argument could be developed more successfully. 47) Among the various challenges to equal consideration, the strategy of appealing to the common-sense moral differences regarding assistance and killing seems strongest. Combining this approach with either, or both, of the suitably developed appeals to moral agency and social bonds may offer the most formidable possible challenge to equal consideration. 48) But the very real possibility the our intuitions regarding assistance and killing are shaped by pro-human, anti-animal prejudice justifies a continued presumption in favour of equal consideration. Only a challenge that was explicit, coherent, and more compelling than any produce so far could overturn that presumption.
Suppose that the presumption favouring equal consideration for animals were successfully overturned, how should we understand animal moral status? As we have seen, the view that animals have moral status is not plausible, in view of the arguments we have canvassed. 49) But there is a position that falls in between that extreme one and the equal-consideration approach, a view that is intuitively fairly plausible and no doubt tacitly accepted by many people.
To get a handle on this view, one needs to imagine two particular scales and then merge them. The first is the phylogenetic scale, or at least one way of construing it. This scale is an evolutionary hierarchy with animal species that are more biologically and cognitively complex closer to the top. The second scale is a hierarchy of moral status. Being at the very top have the highest moral status and deserve full consideration. Beings somewhat lower deserve very serious consideration but less that what the beings on the top deserve. 50) As one moves down this scale of moral status or moral consideration, the amount of consideration one owes to beings at a particular level decreases. At some point one reaches beings who deserve just a little consideration.
答案及译文
主要引用了外研社的斑斓阅读系列的《动物权利》中杨通进的译文。我主要修改了equal consideration，杨的译文翻译为“平等考虑”。我开始想用“平等对待”，后来还是用回了杨的译文“平等考虑”，最后还是改为“平等关爱”。主要是这个词在本书中一直出现，我还是觉得“关爱”好一点。然后修改大一点的是最后一句话。此文章只用来学生做翻译参考练习，不做任何有关商业的用途。若有译文上的错误，请大方之家指出。
Whether or not animals are due equal consideration is an unresolved issue. 46) I have defended a moral presumption in favour of equal consideration, and it is clear that appeals to species will not overturn that presumption. 我已经为一种赞成平等关爱的道德假定做了辩护。很明显，诉诸于物种问题不能*这个假设。Almost as certainly, contract theory will not do so either. But, while no published discussions of the appeals to moral agency and to social bonds have carried the burden of proof on the inegalitarian, it may be premature to preclude the possibility that the relevant argument could be developed more successfully. 47) Among the various challenges to equal consideration, the strategy of appealing to the common-sense moral differences regarding assistance and killing seems strongest. 在对平等关爱的诸多质疑声中，有一种策略诉诸于关于援助与杀戮这样常识性的道德差异，似乎是最为成功的。Combining this approach with either, or both, of the suitably developed appeals to moral agency and social bonds may offer the most formidable possible challenge to equal consideration. 48) But the very real possibility that our intuitions regarding assistance and killing are shaped by pro-human, anti-animal prejudice justifies a continued presumption in favour of equal consideration. 但是，关于援助于杀戮的直觉很可能是由偏爱人类、反对动物的偏见决定的；这种可能性证明了继续赞成平等关爱之假定的合理性。Only a challenge that was explicit, coherent, and more compelling than any produce so far could overturn that presumption.
Suppose that the presumption favouring equal consideration for animals were successfully overturned, how should we understand animal moral status? As we have seen, the view that animals have moral status is not plausible, in view of the arguments we have canvassed. 49) But there is a position that falls in between that extreme one and the equal-consideration approach, a view that is intuitively fairly plausible and no doubt tacitly accepted by many people.但是有一种观点，介于极端的观点与平等关爱之间，这种观点在直觉上似乎是相当可靠的，并且许多人会毫不怀疑的默默接受。
To get a handle on this view, one needs to imagine two particular scales and then merge them. The first is the phylogenetic scale, or at least one way of construing it. This scale is an evolutionary hierarchy with animal species that are more biologically and cognitively complex closer to the top. The second scale is a hierarchy of moral status. Being at the very top have the highest moral status and deserve full consideration. Beings somewhat lower deserve very serious consideration but less that what the beings on the top deserve. 50) As one moves down this scale of moral status or moral consideration, the amount of consideration one owes to beings at a particular level decreases. At some point one reaches beings who deserve just a little consideration.当我们调低道德地位或者道德关爱的标尺时，在特定水平上，我们应该给与这些生物的关爱就会减少。
